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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-2647

LAMIRAN HARDIONO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of
The Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Honorable Miriam K. Mills
(No. A96-264-137)

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 28, 2006
Before: McKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
and RESTANI,* Chief Judge
(Opinion filed October 6, 2006)

OPINION

*

Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Lamiran Hardiono petitions for review of an order issued by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction to consider this petition for review under Section 242(b)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). For the
reasons set forth below, we deny the petition.
I.
We highlight only those facts that are pertinent to our analysis. Hardiono, a
Christian, is a native and citizen of Indonesia. He came to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor on February 26, 2000, and was authorized to stay until August 25,
2000. However, he overstayed his visa and was charged with removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(1)(B). Hardiono conceded the charge of removal and proceeded to apply for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT; in the alternative, he
requested voluntary departure. Hardiono asserted in an affidavit attached to his
applications, as well as in oral testimony, that he feared persecution in Indonesia because
of his religion; however, there were significant differences in his accounts of prior harm
suffered in Indonesia.
The immigration judge (“IJ”) who considered Hardiono’s applications concluded
that he was ineligible for asylum because his petition was filed well after the one-year
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limitations period and failed to provide any reasonable explanation for this delay. See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D) (governing time limitation for asylum claims). In addition,
the IJ found that Hardiono had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future
persecution, because his testimony was not credible and he failed to present objective
evidence of harm due to his religion. As a result, the IJ concluded that Hardiono’s lack of
credibility and absence of other evidence defeated as well his withholding of removal and
CAT claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (governing withholding of removal claims); 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 208.18 (governing CAT claims). The IJ granted Hardiono voluntary
departure, despite her determination that Hardiono lacked credibility.
Hardiono appealed the IJ’s decision with respect to his asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT claims. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Hardiono’s
appeal. In doing so, the BIA agreed that Hardiono’s asylum application was untimely,
that he had not demonstrated the existence of extraordinary circumstances preventing
compliance with the one-year limitations period, and that he had not established that he
would be persecuted or tortured if he returned to Indonesia. The BIA reaffirmed the IJ’s
order permitting Hardiono voluntary departure. Hardiono timely seeks our review.
II.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), we do not have jurisdiction to review the IJ’s
determination that Hardiono’s asylum claim was not filed within the one-year limitations
period, nor can we review a judgment that the period was not tolled by extraordinary
circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir.
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2003).
We do have jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision to deny Hardiono’s petitions
for withholding of removal and CAT relief. Where the BIA “adopts the findings of the IJ
and discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the
decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir.
2004). Where, as here, the IJ concludes that the petitioner is not credible, we review this
determination “for substantial evidence.” Id. Under this standard, “we must uphold an
adverse credibility determination unless ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
Adverse credibility determinations must be “appropriately based on inconsistent
statements, contradictory evidenc[e], and inherently improbable testimony . . . in view of
the background evidence on country conditions.” Chen, 376 F.3d at 223 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Hardiono’s written affidavit and oral
testimony regarding alleged religious persecution in Indonesia were plagued by
significant differences. In addition, Hardiono was unable to explain these inconsistencies.
He also failed to account for the lack of corroboration from his Christian family members
who remain in Indonesia and who supposedly experienced religious attacks alongside
him. As a result, we hold that there was substantial evidence to find that Hardiono’s
testimony was not credible, and therefore that he did not have a well-founded fear of
future persecution or torture.
* * * * *
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Accordingly, we deny Hardiono’s petition for review. We do not disturb the grant
of voluntary departure ordered by the IJ and reaffirmed by the BIA.
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